




Copyright @ 2018 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 
https://cesaa.org.au/anzjes/ 
Vol10 (2) 
ISSN 1837-2147 (Print) 
ISSN 1836-1803 (On-line) 
 
 
The Implications of the EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement on 
the EU’s Role as an International Human Rights Actor 
KATIE HELME 
The University of Melbourne 
Abstract 
While the European Union (EU) discursively frames itself as a values-driven actor, the recent influx of 
individuals seeking asylum within its borders problematises this image. The EU-Turkey refugee 
agreement, signed in March 2016, has been embraced as a mode to offset the burden of mass migration 
to the EU and to reassert the EU’s image as an international human rights actor. This paper contends, 
however, that the agreement negates the EU’s capacity to actively promote human rights norms 
externally by: 1) compromising on its high standards in order to achieve internal cohesion and redress 
waning solidarity between member states; 2) transgressing EU and international laws and norms; 
and 3) relegating the previous approach it has taken to seeking structural reform in Turkey. 
Ultimately, this paper concludes that the EU’s participation in the refugee agreement with Turkey 
delegitimises the EU as an international human rights actor. 
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Introduction 
The European Union (EU) frames itself as a values-driven actor, committed to the 
externalisation of its norms, standards, and principles within its foreign policy, with 
particular regard to the propagation of human rights doctrines. However, the recent 
influx of individuals seeking asylum within the EU, stemming from on-going conflicts 
in its southern neighbourhood, has problematised the EU’s collective commitment to 
its espoused values. In an effort to curtail the movement of ‘irregular migrants’, the EU 
completed an agreement with Turkey in March 2016. The agreement binds Turkey to 
readmit up to 72,000 asylum seekers who have arrived in Greece in return for an equal 
number to be settled within the EU. Additionally, the EU has committed to accelerate 
membership negotiations with Turkey, increase the financial support to Turkey’s 
refugee population, and lift visa restrictions for Turkish citizens within the Schengen 
Area (European Commission 2016a).  
This essay will critically assess the implications of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement 
on the EU’s credibility as an international human rights actor. First, it will be argued 
that the EU has prioritised the securitisation of its external borders over the protection 
of the individual rights of asylum seekers in order to address the lack of solidarity 
amongst member states. Second, this essay will show that the agreement is 
transgressing the EU’s own high standards and breaching aspects of international and 
EU law through rationalising mandatory detention and ‘blanket returns’ of asylum 





has sacrificed the principled approach that it has previously taken to seeking 
significant structural reform in Turkey and promoting its normative agenda. 
Ultimately, it will be concluded that due to the significant concessions on its espoused 
principles it has had to take in order to secure the refugee agreement with Turkey, the 
EU is being delegitimised as an international human rights actor, with the ability to 
credibly ‘preach’ its values.  
Waning Solidarity in EU Asylum Policy 
The EU preaches its own collective and cohesive commitment to high standards within 
its integrated asylum policy and attempts to export these standards to external actors 
(Collett 2016; Karageorgiou 2016). However, despite this espoused common value, the 
adoption of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement reflects a lack of internalised support 
for human rights principles in asylum policy amongst EU member states. During 2015, 
the EU received 1.25 million first time applications from asylum seekers requesting 
international protection, more than doubling the amount it received in 2014 
(European Commission 2016b). It can be seen that the rapid increase of asylum seekers 
has driven the EU to pursue policies to curtail the movement (Crisp 2016). The EU-
Turkey agreement rationalises the return of potential asylum seekers to Turkey as a 
‘safe third country’ or a ‘first country of asylum’, in accordance with Articles 35 and 38 
of the EU Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU) (Council of Europe 2016, 3). The 
return of asylum seekers can be regarded as an attempt to offset the burden and 
alleviate pressures on EU countries, primarily those that serve as entry points for 
migrants. In this way, Biondi (2015) contends that through focusing on providing 
protection in countries of origin or ‘safe third countries’, the norm of external burden 
sharing is designed to dissuade potential asylum applicants from entering the EU. As 
such, the EU has prioritised the securitisation of its external borders over the 
protection of the individual rights of asylum seekers in response to the waning 
‘solidarity’ between member states (Kneebone 2016, 156; Trauner 2016, 313). 
This declining commitment to human rights values within asylum policy is exemplified 
in Hungary’s opposition to the quota of asylum seekers it is required to maintain under 
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). In August 2015 Hungary received 
46,720 asylum applicants, receiving the largest proportion of all the EU member states 
despite its relatively small size and population (European Commission 2016b). Under 
the Dublin Regulation 604/2013 (Dublin III) Hungary was required to offer reception 
of asylum seekers, process claims, and provide international protection to successful 
applicants (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2013; 
Barbulescu 2016, 4). However, the lack of internalised commitment to the protection 
of the rights of asylum seekers and the ontological insecurity caused by mass migration 
compelled Hungary to close its border with Croatia in September 2015 in an effort to 
alter the migration flow (Park 2016). Moreover, in response the Hungarian 
government launched Case C-647/15 against the Council of the European Union within 
the European Court of Justice, arguing that it was being unfairly overburdened with 
migrants under the quota system (CURIA 2015). It can be seen that through extending 
its partnership with Turkey, the EU is attempting to stem the flow of migrants in order 
to appease the national security interests of its member states. Hence the EU is visibly 
sacrificing the normative values that it preaches to other external actors in order to 
achieve internal cohesion. 
Transgressing Internal and International Laws 
Helme, ANZJES 10(2) 
 
70 
Furthermore, the EU-Turkey agreement is transgressing aspects of EU and 
international law through failing to protect the human rights of migrants seeking 
asylum within its borders. Primarily this has been shown in the contentious legal basis 
for returning asylum seekers to Turkey. The EU has rationalised the returns by defining 
Turkey as a ‘safe third country’ or a ‘first country of asylum’. Accordingly, this enabled 
the EU to return 573 ‘irregular migrants’ to Turkey by October 2016 (European 
Commission 2016c). However, the EU’s return policy involves ‘blanket returns’ 
without “spelling out” the refugee protection safeguards in accordance with 
international law (UNHCR 2016). The agreement also appears to contradict Article 4 
of the European Convention of Human Rights, which prohibits the “collective 
expulsion of aliens”. Moreover the ‘blanket return’ policy appears to contradict Article 
43 of the EU Asylum Procedures Directive, which requires the EU to “examine all 
applications on substance” (European Parliament and the European Council 2013). As 
such, the inconsistencies between the agreement with Turkey and other aspects of the 
EU’s integrated asylum policy indicate a lack of horizontal coherence. By failing to 
develop a coherent and cohesive approach to asylum policy the EU is undermining its 
appearance as an effective international actor. 
Moreover, by failing to conform to international laws and standards, the EU is losing 
support from international and nongovernmental organisations. This is exemplified in 
the EU’s systematic detention of asylum seekers. The EU-Turkey agreement permits 
the detention of asylum seekers in ‘hotspots’ on the Greek Islands, supported by Greek 
law 4375/2016, adopted in April 2016. Article 14 of the law provides for the automatic 
detention of asylum seekers for between 3-25 days to process claims of new arrivals, 
and enables the detention of asylum seekers, including those to be returned to Turkey, 
for up to 18 months (Council of Europe 2016, 6). However, this automatic detention 
contravenes the principles of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), which maintains a 
fundamental objection to ‘mandatory detention’ as “any decision to detain must be 
based on the individual’s particular circumstances” (UNHCR 2012, 16). As such, in 
objection to the EU-Turkey agreement the UNHCR suspended activities in the Greek 
Islands on 22 March 2016 (Fleming 2016). Moreover, nongovernmental organisations 
including the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Save the Children have 
withdrawn services out of concern for potential human rights abuses within the 
detention sites (Collett 2016). It can be seen that the EU derives its legitimacy as an 
international protector of human rights through support and recognition by 
international and nongovernmental organisations. Thus, by failing to abide by its own 
espoused norms and contravening international standards, the EU is being 
delegitimised as an international human rights actor. 
Abandoning the EU’s Normative Agenda in Turkey 
Moreover, through engaging in the agreement the EU is sacrificing the principled 
approach it has taken to seeking structural reform within Turkey. The EU has used its 
enlargement policy as a way of advancing its normative agenda and exporting its 
values. However, while the EU has been undertaking membership negotiations with 
Turkey since 1999, to date only 1 of the 35 negotiated chapters has been completed 
(Alaranta 2016; Oner 2014). The stalling of negotiations has coincided with a period of 
stagnation in Turkey’s democratic reform process (Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber 2016). 
Alaranta (2015, 10) argues that the accession negotiations have been problematised by 
the “hegemonic discourse of a ‘New Turkey’” propagated by the ruling Justice and 





reflected a shift away from Europeanisation and democratisation. Due to the lack of 
conformity to its espoused norms, the EU has criticised Turkey, voicing particular 
concern for the lack of freedom of press, expression, and assembly, as well as the 
disproportionate use of force by police against protestors (Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber 
2016, 2). This was exemplified in the Gezi Park protests in May 2013, in which Turkish 
citizens demonstrated against the growing authoritarian nature of the AKP 
government, with particular emphasis on the freedom of expression. The protests 
resulted in the death of 5 people, with 8,000 reported as injured (Aydın 2014). In the 
2013 Turkey Progress Report, the European Commission condemned the Turkish 
government’s “excessive use of force” and the need for law enforcement to be “brought 
in line with European standards” to guarantee “respect for human rights and the right 
to freedom of assembly” (European Commission 2013, 2). It can be seen that the EU 
has been highly critical of Turkey in the past and has attempted to export its human 
rights norms.  
By engaging in the refugee agreement with Turkey, however, the EU is making 
concessions on the principled approach it has previously taken to promoting its human 
rights values in Turkey. The agreement promises to speed-up visa liberalisation for 
Turkish citizens to access the Schengen Area, although it is yet to grant it. In order to 
receive visa liberalisation Turkey needs to achieve 72 benchmarks, including document 
security, migration management, public order and security, fundamental rights, and 
readmission of irregular migrants (European Commission 2016b). However, little 
emphasis has been placed on human rights, particularly freedom of expression, as a 
criterion. Through granting this concession and providing Turkey with a privilege 
usually reserved for members, the EU is sacrificing a bargaining tool that would aid it 
in pursuing political reform in Turkey (Alaranta 2016). Verhofstadt (2016) argues that 
the EU-Turkey agreement diminishes the EU’s image as a protector of freedom of 
speech and freedom of press, and ensures that the EU has “forfeited any right to 
lecture” Erdogan. However, it is important to note the values that the EU is attempting 
to export are inherently Eurocentric, and do not necessarily reflect the individual 
context of Turkey. Nonetheless, through failing to uphold its own principles with 
regard to the exportation of its values, the EU is undermining its self-professed role as 
a values-driven actor. In this way, the EU is approaching Turkey as a strategic partner 
rather than as a potential member, prioritising its own security concerns over seeking 
political reform (Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016, 3). Ultimately, it can be seen that the 
EU’s selective pursuit of the exportation of human rights doctrines, as displayed in the 
agreement with Turkey, is undermining its role as an international human rights actor. 
Conclusion 
This essay has critically analysed the implications of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement 
for the role of the EU as an international human rights actor. First the essay argued 
that the EU frames itself as a unified, model power, which propagates certain universal 
values that it is committed to upholding. However, through engaging in the agreement 
with Turkey the EU is visibly sacrificing the normative values that it preaches to other 
external actors in order to achieve internal cohesion. Second, this essay contended that 
the EU has prioritised the securitisation of its external boarders over the individual 
rights of asylum seekers, rationalising the ‘blanket return’ and detention of asylum 
seekers. Accordingly, the EU has lost credibility with international and 
nongovernmental organisations through transgressing aspects of international and EU 
law and failing to protect the rights of asylum seekers. Third, this essay showed that 
Helme, ANZJES 10(2) 
 
72 
the EU has made significant concessions on the approach it has traditionally taken to 
seeking human rights reform in Turkey in order to secure the agreement. Ultimately, 
it can be concluded that the EU-Turkey refugee agreement is delegitimising the EU as 
a credible international actor with the capacity to preach normative human rights 
values. 
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